Consider the representative task of designing a distributed coin-tossing protocol for n processors such that the probability of heads is X0 ∈ [0, 1], and an adversary can reset one processor to change the distribution of the final outcome. For X0 = 1/2, in the non-cryptographic setting, no adversary can deviate the probability of the outcome of the well-known Blum's "majority protocol" by more than insecure. In this paper, we study discrete-time martingales (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) such that Xi ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and Xn ∈ {0, 1}. These martingales are commonplace in modeling stochastic processes like coin-tossing protocols in the non-cryptographic setting mentioned above. In particular, for any X0 ∈ [0, 1], we construct martingales that yield
insecure. In this paper, we study discrete-time martingales (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) such that Xi ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and Xn ∈ {0, 1}. These martingales are commonplace in modeling stochastic processes like coin-tossing protocols in the non-cryptographic setting mentioned above. In particular, for any X0 ∈ [0, 1], we construct martingales that yield 1 2 X 0 (1−X 0 ) n insecure coin-tossing protocols with n-bit communication; irrespective of the number of bits required to represent the output distribution. Note that for sufficiently small X0, we achieve higher security than Moran et al.'s protocol even against computationally unbounded adversaries. For X0 = 1/2, our protocol requires only 40% of the processors to achieve the same security as the majority protocol.
The technical heart of our paper is a new inductive technique that uses geometric transformations to precisely account for the large gaps in these martingales. For any X0 ∈ [0, 1], we show that there exists a stopping time τ such that
The inductive technique simultaneously constructs martingales that demonstrate the optimality of our bound, i.e., a martingale where the gap corresponding to any stopping time is small. In particular, we construct optimal martingales such that any stopping time τ has 1 √ 2πn
, i.e., the majority protocol is
insecure. To construct a bias-X 0 coin, where X 0 has a t-bit binary representation, we compose t majority protocols in parallel. This protocol has t · n-bit communication complexity and continues to be
insecure. If X 0 does not have a t-bit binary representation (for example, say, X 0 = 1/3, X 0 = 1/e, or X 0 = 1/n) then we construct a bias-X ′ 0 coin, where X ′ 0 is the t-bit truncation of X 0 . This protocol has t · n-communication complexity and is
insecure. That is, we must have t = Ω(log n) for the protocol to be O 1 √ n insecure.
Alternatively, we can partition the processors into t groups and each group generates one bit using the majority protocol. This protocol has n-bit communication and insecurity. However, this protocol shall reduce the security of the protocol by t = Ω(log n) factor, which is not desirable. The MNS Protocol. Against computationally bounded adversaries, for any X 0 ∈ [0, 1], Moran, Naor, and Segev [29] construct a bias-X 0 coin that is O 1 n insecure with linear communication complexity (based on general MPC with linear communication complexity [2] ).
Our New Protocol. We shall prove a general martingale result in this paper that yields the following result as a corollary. For any X 0 ∈ [0, 1], there exists an n-bit bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol in the non-cryptographic setting that is 1 2 
X0(1−X0) n
insecure; irrespective of the number of bits required to represent X 0 . In the sequel, we highlight some consequences of our result. For sufficiently small X 0 , our coin-tossing protocol is more secure than the MNS protocol [29] even in the non-cryptographic setting. For example, when X 0 = protocol for n processors where the probability of a processor being elected the leader is proportional to its computational power. Because, a faster processor is more likely to have the additional bandwidth to accommodate the overhead of performing the tasks of the leader. We do not want an adversary to significantly change the probability of the leader belonging to any (proper) subset of the processors by restarting at most one processor. This task corresponds to a distributed dice-rolling protocol with ω = n. The complexity of representing the distribution of the final outcome (roughly) depends on the ratio of the minimum to the maximum computational power of the processors. If this ratio is ≪ 1/poly(n), then the solutions using the "majority protocol" discussed above shall require t ≫ log n. Consequently, their communication complexity or insecurity is not sufficiently small. Our protocols, on the other hand, use n-bit communication and are
insecure. Formal Framework: Martingales. Martingales are natural models for several stochastic processes. Intuitively, martingales correspond to a gradual release of information about an event. A priori, we know that the probability of the event is X 0 . For instance, in a distributed n-party coin-tossing protocol the outcome being 1 is the event of interest. A discrete-time martingale (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) represents the gradual release of information about the event over n time-steps.
2
For intuition, we can assume that X i represents the probability that the outcome of the coin-tossing protocol is 1 after the first i parties have broadcast their messages. Martingales have the unique property that if we compute the expected value of X j , for j > i, at the end of time-step i, it is identical to the value of X i . In this paper we shall consider martingales where, at the end of time-step n, we know for sure whether the event of interest has occurred or not. That is, we have X n ∈ {0, 1}.
A stopping time τ represents a time step ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} where we stop the evolution of the martingale. The test of whether to stop the martingale at time-step i is a function only of the information revealed so far. Furthermore, this stopping time need not be a constant. That is, for example, different transcripts of the coin-tossing protocol potentially have different stopping times.
Our Martingale Problem Statement. The inspiration of our approach is best motivated using a two-player game between, namely, the martingale designer and the adversary. Fix n and X 0 . The martingale designer presents a martingale X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) to the adversary and the adversary finds a stopping time τ that maximizes the following quantity.
Intuitively, the adversary demonstrates the most severe susceptibility of the martingale by presenting the corresponding stopping time τ as a witness. The martingale designer's objective is to design martingales that have less susceptibility. Our research uses a geometric approach to inductively provide tight bounds on the least susceptibility of martingales for all n 1 and X 0 ∈ [0, 1], that is, the following quantity.
This precise study of C n (X 0 ), for general X 0 ∈ [0, 1], is motivated by natural applications in discrete process control as illustrated by the representative motivating problem. This paper, for representative applications of our results, considers n-processor distributed protocols and 2-party n-round protocols. The stopping time witnessing the highest susceptibility shall translate into appropriate adversarial strategies.
Our Contributions
We prove the following general martingale theorem.
◮ Theorem 1. Let (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a discrete-time martingale such that X i ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and X n ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the following bound holds.
where C 1 (X) = 2X(1 − X), and, for n > 1, we obtain C n from C n−1 recursively using the geometric transformation defined in Figure 7 . Furthermore, for all n 1 and X 0 ∈ 
Intuitively, given a martingale, an adversary can identify a stopping time where the expected gap in the martingale is at least C n (X 0 ). Moreover, there exists a martingale that realizes the lower-bound in the tightest manner, i.e., all stopping times τ have identical susceptibility. Next, we estimate the value of the function C n (X).
◮ Lemma 2.
For n 1 and X ∈ [0, 1], we have
In the sequel, we highlight applications of Theorem 1 to protocol constructions and hardness of computation results using these estimates.
◮ Remark 3 (Protocol Constructions). The optimal martingales naturally translate into n-bit distributed coin-tossing and multi-faceted dice rolling protocols.
Corollary 11:
For all X 0 ∈ [0, 1], there exists an n-bit distributed bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol for n processors with the following security guarantee. Any (computationally unbounded) adversary who follows the protocol honestly and resets at most one of the processors during the execution of the protocol can change the probability of an outcome by at most
. Section 1 discusses the comparison of this construction with existing algorithms.
Corollary 12:
A distributed ω-faceted dice-rolling protocol helps n processors agree on a symbol from the set {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1}. For an arbitrary distribution of the final outcome over the set {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1}, we present an n-bit protocol where any adversary can change the probability of any subset of outcomes by at most . In other words, their bound guarantees 3 The coordinate exposure filtration reveals one bit at a time of the final outcome.
that the expected gap in the martingale is at least
, which is significantly smaller than our bound
. Hardness of computation results relying on [15] (and its extensions) work only for constant 0 < X 0 < 1. However, our lower-bound holds for all X 0 ∈ [0, 1]; for example, even when 1/poly(n) X 0 1 − 1/poly(n). Consequently, we extend existing hardness of computation results using our more general lower-bound. 1. Theorem 13 extends the fail-stop attack of [15] on 2-party bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocols (in the information-theoretic commitment hybrid). For any X 0 ∈ [0, 1], a fail-stop adversary can change the probability of the final outcome of any 2-party bias-X 0 cointossing protocol by
. This result is useful to demonstrate black-box separations results. 2. Corollary 17 extends the black-box separation results of [16, 23, 17] separating (appropriate restrictions of) 2-party bias-X 0 coin tossing protocols from one-way functions. We illustrate a representative new result that follows as a consequence of Corollary 17. For constant X 0 ∈ (0, 1), [16, 23, 17] rely on (the extensions of) [15] to show that it is highly unlikely that there exist 2-party bias-X 0 coin tossing protocols using one-way functions in a black-box manner achieving o(1/ √ n) unfairness [22] . Note that when X 0 = 1/n, there are secure 2-party coin tossing protocols with 1/2n unfairness (based on Corollary 11) even in the non-cryptographic setting. Previous results cannot determine the limits to the unfairness of 2-party bias-1/n fair coin-tossing protocols that use one-way functions in a black-box manner. Our black-box separation result (refer to Corollary 17) implies that it is highly unlikely to construct bias-1/n coin using one-way functions in a blackbox manner with < √ 2 12·n 3/2 unfairness. In general, our black-box separation results also extend to a dice-rolling functionality where the bound on the unfairness is independent of the complexity of describing the output distribution. 3. Corollary 18 and Corollary 19 extend [15] 's result on influencing discrete control processes.
Finally, Theorem 20 demonstrates the versatility of our geometric approach by measuring large L 2 -norm gaps in martingales. Study of the large gaps in martingales using the L 2 -norm turns out useful for obtaining the upper bound on C n (X) in Lemma 2.
Prior Approaches to the General Martingale Problem
Note that the martingale starts from X 0 and ends with X n ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, there exists a round i where the gap in the martingale is at least min{X0,1−X0} n . The entire non-triviality arises due to the objective of demonstrating a ≈ 1 √ n gap in the martingale instead of ≈ 1 n gap. Additionally, it is essential that the stopping time τ not be restricted to being constant. Because, there exist martingales such that, for all constant stopping times τ , the expected gap is only ≈ 1 n (see Figure 1 for such an example). Burkholder's inequalities are a major tool for martingale analysis. (One form of) Burkholder's inequality states that for 1 < p < ∞, there exists constant c 1 and c 2 such that the following identity holds
The right-side of the inequality can be used to obtain a lower bound on the average change in the martingale. Since, X n ∈ {0, 1}, note that we have E |X n | p = X 0 . So, we conclude that
However, it is unclear how to use this form of the inequality to deduce lower-bounds of the form Ω(1/ √ n), which is the focus of our work. We know that the stopping time τ cannot be a constant, so averaging arguments seem ineffective (see Figure 1) . Therefore, the use of Burkholder-type inequalities or other square function inequalities in our context is not evident. 
Prior works approach this problem as a negation of the Azuma's inequality. AzumaHoeffding inequality [7, 25] states that if
, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then, essentially, |X n − X 0 | = o(1) with probability 1, i.e., the final information X n remains close to the a priori information X 0 . However, X n ∈ {0, 1}, in particular, implies that the final information X n is significantly different from the a priori information X 0 . So, the initial constraint "for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
What is the probability of this violation? For X 0 = 1/2, Cleve and Impagliazzo [15] proved that there exists a round i such that
√ n with probability 1/5. We emphasize that the round i is a random variable and not a constant. Recently, in an independent work, Beimel et al. [8] demonstrate an identical bound for weak martingales (that have some additional properties), which is used to model multi-party coin-tossing protocols.
For the upper-bound, on the other hand, Doob's martingale corresponding to the majority protocol is the only known martingale for X 0 = 1/2. Martingales that have small gaps corresponding to any stopping time are relatively unknown.
Preliminaries
We denote the arithmetic mean of two numbers as A.M. 
be a discrete-time martingale sequence with respect to the sequence
. This statement implies that for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, we have
Note that the definition of martingale implies X i to be E 1 , . . . , E i measurable for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and X 0 to be constant. In the sequel, we shall use
} to denote a martingale sequence where for each i = 1, . . . , n, X i ∈ [0, 1], and X n ∈ {0, 1}. However, for brevity, we use (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) to denote a martingale. Given a function f :
is a martingale with respect to 
we define the score of a martingale sequence (X, E) with respect to a stopping time τ in L ℓ -norm as the following quantity.
We define the max stopping time as the stopping time that maximizes the score
and the (corresponding) max-score as
} such that X 0 = x * and X n ∈ {0, 1}. We define optimal score as opt n (x * , ℓ) := inf
. . . Figure 2 Interpreting a general martingale as a tree. Representing a Martingale as a Tree. A discrete time martingale sequence X = {X i } n i=0 defined over a sample space Ω = Ω 1 × · · · × Ω n , can be represented by a tree of depth n (see Figure 2 ). For i = 0, . . . , n, any node at depth i has |Ω i+1 | children. In fact, for each i, the edge between a node at depth i and a child at depth (i + 1) corresponds to a possible outcome that E i+1 can take from the set Ω i+1 = {x (1) , . . . , x (t) }.
Each node v at depth i is represented by a unique path from root to v like (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e i ), which corresponds to the event {ω ∈ Ω|E 1 (ω) = e 1 , . . . , E i (ω) = e i }. Specifically, each path from root to a leaf in this tree, represents a unique outcome in the sample space Ω.
Each edge between the node (e 1 , . . . , e i ) and the node (e 1 , . . . , e i , e i+1 ), is labeled by
, which is the probability of observing edge e i+1 (or equivalently, observing the node (e 1 , . . . , e i , e i+1 ) at time (i + 1) conditioned on reaching the node (e 1 , . . . , e i ) at time i). Moreover, each node (e 1 , . . . , e i+1 ) is labeled by X i+1 (e 1 , . . . , e i+1 ), which, according to the definition of martingale, satisfies
Intuitively, the label assigned to each node is equal to the average of its children's labels, where each child is weighted by the conditional probability assigned to the edge between that node and the child.
Any subset of nodes in a tree that has the property that none of them is an ancestor of any other, is called an anti-chain. If we use our tree-based notation to represent a node v, i.e., the sequence of edges e 1 , . . . , e i corresponding to the path from root to v, then any prefixfree subset of nodes is an anti-chain. Any anti-chain that is not a proper subset of another anti-chain is called a maximal anti-chain. A stopping time in a martingale corresponds to a unique maximal anti-chain in the martingale tree. 
Large Gaps in Martingales: A Geometric Approach
This section presents a high-level overview of our proof strategy. In the sequel, we shall assume that we are working with discrete-time martingales (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) such that X n ∈ {0, 1}. Given a martingale (X 0 , . . . , X n ), its susceptibility is represented by the following quantity sup
Intuitively, if a martingale has high susceptibility, then it has a stopping time such that the gap in the martingale while encountering the stopping time is large. Our objective is to characterize the least susceptibility that a martingale (X 0 , . . . , X n ) can achieve. More formally, given n and X 0 , characterize
Our approach is to proceed by induction on n to exactly characterize the curve C n (X), and our argument naturally constructs the best martingale that achieves C n (X 0 ).
1.
We know that the base case is C 1 (X) = 2X(1 − X) (see Figure 4 for this argument).
2.
Given the curve C n−1 (X), we identify a geometric transformation T (see Figure 7 ) that defines the curve C n (X) from the curve C n−1 (X). Subsection 3.1 summarizes the proof of this inductive step that crucially relies on the geometric interpretation of the problem, which is one of our primary technical contributions. Furthermore, for any n 1, there exist martingales such that its susceptibility is C n (X 0 ).
Finally, Subsection 3.2 proves that the curve
C n (X) lies above the curve L n (X) := 2 √ 2n−1 X(1− X) and below the curve U n (X) := 1 √ n X(1 − X).
Proof of Theorem 1
Our objective is the following.
1.
Given an arbitrary martingale (X, E), find the maximum stopping time in this martingale, i.e., the stopping time τ max (X, E, 1). 2. For any depth n and bias X 0 , construct a martingale that achieves the max-score. We refer to this martingale as optimal martingale. A priori, this martingale need not be unique. However, we shall see that for each X 0 , it is (essentially) a unique martingale.
We emphasize that even if we are only interested in the exact value of C n (X 0 ) for
. . , X n ), the value of X 1 can be arbitrary. So, without a precise characterization of the value C n−1 (X 1 ), it is not evident how to calculate the value of C n (X 0 = 1/2). Furthermore, understanding C n (X 0 ), for all X 0 ∈ [0, 1], yields entirely new applications for our result. Base Case of n = 1. For a martingale (X 0 , X 1 ) of depth n = 1, we have X 1 ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that E 1 takes only two values (see Figure 4 ). Then, it is easy to verify that the max-score is always equal to 2X 0 (1 − X 0 ). This score is witnessed by the stopping time τ = 1. So, we conclude that opt
Step. n = 2 (For Intuition). For simplicity, let us consider finite martingales, i.e., the sample space Ω i of the random variable E i is finite. Suppose that the root X 0 = x in the corresponding martingale tree has t children with values x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (t) , and the probability of choosing the j-th child is p (j) , where j ∈ {1, . . . , t} (see Figure 5 ). Given a martingale (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 ), the adversary's objective is to find the stopping time τ that maximizes the score E |X τ − X τ −1 | . If the adversary chooses to stop at τ = 0, then the score E |X τ − X τ −1 | = 0, which is not a good strategy. So, for each j, the adversary chooses whether to stop at the child x (j) , or continue to a stopping time in the sub-tree rooted at x (j) . The adversary chooses the stopping time based on which of these two strategies yield a better score. If the adversary stops the martingale at child j, then the contribution of this decision to the score is p (j) x (j) − x . On the other hand, if she does not stop at child j, then the contribution from the sub-tree is guaranteed to be p
the j-th child, an adversary obtains a score that is at least
Figure 4
Base Case for Theorem 1. Note
The optimal stopping time is shaded and its score is
Figure 5 Inductive step for Theorem 1. M Sj represents the max-score of the sub-tree of depth n − 1 whose rooted at x (j) . For simplicity, the subtree of x (j) is only shown here.
X-axis
Y -axis Figure 6 Intuitive summary of the inductive step for n = 2.
a two dimensional plane. Then, clearly all these points lie on the solid curve defined by max |X − x| , C 1 (X) , see Figure 6 . Since (X, E) is a martingale, we have x = t j=1 p (j) x (j) and the adversary's strategy for finding τ max gives us max-score
. So, the point in the plane giving the adversary the maximum score for a tree of depth n = 2 with bias X 0 = x lies in the intersection of the convex hull of the points Z (1) , . . . , Z (t) , and the line X = x. Let us consider the martingale defined in Figure 6 as a concrete example. Here t = 4, and the points Z (1) , Z (2) , Z (3) , Z (4) lie x) is defined below.
, y (2) ), where
, and H.M.(y (1) , y (2) ) represents the harmonic mean of y (1) and y (2) .
Y -axis on max |X − x| , C 1 (X) . The martingale designer specifies the probabilities p (1) , p (2) , p (3) , and p (4) , such that p
These probabilities are not represented in Figure 6 . Note that the point p
ing the score of the adversary is the point p
. This point lies inside the convex hull of the points Z (1) , . . . , Z (4) and on the line
The exact location depends on p (1) , . . . , p (4) . The point Q ′ is the point with minimum height. Observe that the height of the point Q ′ is at least the height of the point Q. So, in any martingale, the adversary shall find a stopping time that scores more than (the height of) the point Q. On the other hand, the martingale designer's objective is to reduce the score that an adversary can achieve. So, the martingale designer chooses t = 2, and the two points Z
(1) = P 1 and Z (2) = P 2 to construct the optimum martingale. We apply this method for each x ∈ [0, 1] to find the corresponding point Q. That is, the locus of the point Q, for x ∈ [0, 1], yields the curve C 2 (X). Note that the height of Q is the harmonic-mean of the heights of P 1 and P 2 .
This property inspires the definition of the geometric transformation T , see Figure 7 . Applying T on the curve C 1 (X) yields the curve C 2 (X) for which we have C 2 (x) = opt 2 (x, 1).
General Inductive
Step. Note that a similar approach works for general n = d 2. Fix X 0 and n = d 2. We assume that the adversary can compute
Suppose the root in the corresponding martingale tree has t children with values x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (t) , and the probability of choosing the j-th child is p (j) (see Figure 5 ). Let (X (j) , E (j) ) represent the martingale associated with the sub-tree rooted at x (j) .
X-axis
Y -axis
• Z (1) • Z (2) • Z (3) • Z (4) • Z (5) • Z (6) • Z (7) ⊗ Q ′ Figure 8 Intuitive Summary of the inductive argument. Our objective is to pick the set of points {Z (1) , Z (2) . . . } in the gray region to minimize the length of the intercept XQ ′ of their (lower) convex hull on the line X = x. Clearly, the unique optimal solution corresponds to including both P1 and P2 in the set.
For any j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the adversary can choose to stop at the child j. This decision will contribute x (j) − x to the score with weight p (j) . On the other hand, if she continues to the subtree rooted at x (j) , she will get at least a contribution of max-score 1 (X (j) , E (j) ) with weight p (j) . Therefore, the adversary can obtain the following contribution to her score
Similar to the case of n = 2, we define the points Z (1) , . . . , Z (t) . For n > 2, there is one difference from the n = 2 case. The point Z (j) need not lie on the solid curve, but it can lie on or above it, i.e., they lie in the gray area of Figure 8 . Note that a suboptimal martingale designer can produce martingales with suboptimal scores, i.e., above the solid curve. For n = 1 it happens to be the case that there is (effectively) only one martingale that the martingale designer can design (the optimal tree). The adversary obtains a score that is at least the height of the point Q ′ , which is at least the height of Q. On the other hand, the martingale designer can choose t = 2, and Z
(1) = P 1 and Z (2) = P 2 to define the optimum martingale. Again, the locus of the point Q is defined by the curve T (C d−1 ). Appendix A provides further details of the proof.
So, by induction, we have proved that C n (X) = T n−1 (C 1 (X)). Additionally, note that, during induction, in the optimum martingale, we always have
) and
). Intuitively, the decision to stop at x (j) or continue to the subtree rooted at x (j) has identical consequence. So, by induction, all stopping times in the optimum martingale have score C n (x).
Estimation of C n (X) : Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we prove Lemma 2, which tightly estimates the curve C n .
Recall that we defined L n (X) =
To this end, we define the curve
for all X ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 10 that a n
, and so G n L n (Observe that since we do not have a closed form for G n , we use L n as a lower bound).
Proof. Since G n L n , it is sufficient to prove by induction that U n C n G n . Claim 5) . Note that C n+1 = T (C n ). We shall prove that T (G n ) G n+1 , and U n+1 T (U n ) (refer to Claim 6 and Claim 8) respectively. Consequently, it follows that U n+1 C n+1 G n+1 . Figure 9 pictorially summarizes this argument.
Base Case of
◭
Claim 8
Claim 5 Claim 5 Figure 9 The outline of the inductive proof demonstrating that if the curves Ui and Gi sandwich the curve Ci, then the curves Ui+1 and Gi+1 sandwich the curve Ci+1. Recall that the notation "A B" implies that the curve A lies on-or-above the curve B.
A crucial property of convex upwards curves that we use in our proof is the following. Figure 10 Summary of the proof of Claim 5.
In the following claim, we show that the transformation of a curve whose characteristics are specified below, will be "above" the curve itself. for all n 1. Then, we have
Proof. For each k, the curve F k is a concave downward curve that contains the points (0, 0) and (1, 0), so based on Claim 7, for each k, the curve T ( 1 − x 1 ). So, we have
F n is a symmetric curve around 1 2 ), y 1 can be found by replacing x with 1 − x in the formula that we found for y 0 .
To prove the claim, it suffices to show that the harmonic mean of y 0 and y 1 is at least equal to f n+1 x(1 − x). We make the substitution x = 1/2 − z and we need to consider only z ∈ [0, 1/2] because as mentioned earlier the curves are symmetric around the line X = 1/2.
From this substitution, we get
So, we need to prove the following
In above, we used the fact that for any a, b, .(a,b) . The last inequality is correct due to RMS-AM inequality. This completes the proof of the claim. ◭
In the following claim, we show that the geometric transformation T preserves some characteristics of the curve it is transforming -specifically if the original curve was concave downward and symmetric around 1 2 then the new curve obtained will also retain these properties.
⊲ Claim 7. Suppose the curve C which is concave downward in the interval X ∈ [0, 1] and symmetric around 1 2 , and the points (0, 0) and (1, 0) lie on it -is given. Suppose the curve F is a curve defined by applying transformation T , defined in Figure 7 , on curve C. Then, F has the same properties i.e. F is also concave downward, symmetric around Proof. Since C is symmetric around (1) , y (2) ) where
) where x (1) is the solution of X + f (X) = x and x (2) is the
which implies that T (C) is symmetric around 1 2 . For x = 0 or x = 1, y (1) or y (2) is 0 and so g(1) = g(0) = 0. We provide a geometric proof to show that F is concave downwards and use Figure 11 as illustration. We know that a curve is concave downward in an interval if and only if the line that joins any two points of the curve is below the curve. Let us fix x 1 x 3 in [0, 1], see Figure 11 . The height of points H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are respectively the value of T (C) at points x 1 , x 2 , x 3 respectively. Our goal is to show that H 2 is above the segment H 1 H 3 for any choice of x 2 . Observe that, H 2 lies on the segment P 2 Q 2 . Since C is concave down, the segment P 2 Q 2 is above the segment F 1 F 2 . Note that we are fixing x 1 and x 3 and allowing x 2 to change between x 1 and x 3 . Then, we see that the segment F 1 F 2 changes from P 1 Q 1 to P 3 Q 3 and is always above the segment
• P1
• Q1
• P3
• Q3
• H1
• H2
• H3 ⊲ Claim 8. Let U n be defined by the zeros of the curve Y = u n X(1 − X), where u n > 0 for all n 1 and X ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we have U n+1 T (U n ).
Proof. Let x 0 be the smaller of the two roots of the equation x 0 + u n x 0 (1 − x 0 ) = x, and x 1 be the larger of the two roots of the equation x + u n x 1 (1 − x 1 ) = x 1 . So, we have
Now, let y 0 = u n x 0 (1 − x 0 ). Then, we have
We substitute x = 1/2 − z and need to consider only z ∈ [0, 1/2] because the curves are symmetric around the line X = 1/2. From this substitution, we have
Now, the expression of
. So, to prove the claim, we need to prove that
The final inequality follows from the HM-GM inequality and the following simplifications
This observation completes the proof. ◭
The following mathematical result is used in the proof of Lemma 10.
◮ Lemma 9. For x 0, we have
Proof. 1
The last inequality follows from the RMS-AM inequality. ◭ ◮ Lemma 10. Suppose a sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . is given such that a n+1 = 2 √ a 2 n +1−1 an , then a n 1 
Application 1 : Distributed Coin-Tossing Protocol
We consider constructing distributed n-processor coin-tossing protocols where the i-th processor broadcasts her message in the i-th round. Motivated by efficiency considerations, we study this problem in the non-cryptographic setting. The only protocol known for this problem exists for X 0 = 1/2 using the incredibly elegant "majority protocol" [11, 6, 14] . The i-th processor broadcasts her one random bit in round i. The final outcome of the protocol is the majority of the n outcomes, and an adversary can bias the final outcome by
by restarting a processor once [14] . We construct distributed n-party bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocols, for any X 0 ∈ [0, 1], and our new protocol for X 0 = 1/2 is more robust to restarting attacks than this majority protocol. Fix X 0 ∈ [0, 1] and n 1. Consider the optimal martingale (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) guaranteed by Theorem 1. The susceptibility corresponding to any stopping time is =
. Note that we can construct an n-party coin-tossing protocol where the i-th processor broadcasts the i-th message, and the corresponding Doob's martingale is identical to this optimal martingale. An adversary who can restart a processor once biases the outcome of this protocol by at most 1 2 C n (X 0 ), this is discussed in Section 6.
◮ Corollary 11 (Distributed Coin-tossing Protocols). For every X 0 ∈ [0, 1] and n 1 there exists an n-party bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol such that any adversary who can restart a processor once causes the final outcome probability to deviate by
For X 0 = 1/2, our new protocol's outcome can be changed by deviation of the majority protocol. However, we do not know whether there exists a computationally efficient algorithm implementing the coin-tossing protocols corresponding to the optimal martingales.
Next, we reduce a distributed dice-rolling protocol for an arbitrary ω-faceted dice to a sequence of distributed coin-tossing protocols. The reduction shall perform a binary search of depth d = ⌈lg ω⌉ using distributed coin-tossing protocols among n/d processors for each binary search. For example, in the first phase, the first n/d processors shall determine whether the outcome is < ω/2 or not. An adversary can deviate the outcome in this phase by
. Using union bound over d binary searches, the upper-bound to the deviation is . We emphasize that this reduction crucially relies on the fact that the distributed bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol exists for any X 0 ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, the depth of a naïve binary search shall depend on the maximum number of bits required to represent the probabilities of every outcome of the ω-faceted dice-roll.
◮ Corollary 12 (Distributed Dice-rolling Protocols). For any ω-faceted dice-rolling functionality, and n 1 there exists an n-party protocol for this functionality such that any adversary who can restart a processor once can cause the probability of any subset of outcomes to deviate by For future research, we propose investigating the construction of dice-rolling protocols via vector-valued martingales that minimize "large gaps."
Application 2: Fail-stop Attacks on Coin-tossing/Dice-rolling Protocols
A two-party n-round bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol is an interactive protocol between two parties who send messages in alternate rounds, and X 0 is the probability of the coin-tossing protocol's outcome being heads. Fair computation ensures that even if one of the parties aborts during the execution of the protocol, the other party outputs a (randomized) heads/tails outcome. This requirement of guaranteed output delivery is significantly stringent, and Cleve [14] demonstrated a computationally efficient attack strategy that alters the output-distribution by O(1/n), i.e., any protocol is O(1/n) unfair. Defining fairness and constructing fair protocols for general functionalities has been a field of highly influential research [21, 22, 9, 5, 3, 28, 4] . This interest stems primarily from the fact that fairness is a desirable attribute for secure-computation protocols in real-world applications. However, designing fair protocol even for simple functionalities like (bias-1/2) coin-tossing is challenging both in the two-party and the multi-party setting. In the multi-party setting, several works [6, 10, 1] explore fair coin-tossing where the number of adversarial parties is a constant fraction of the total number of parties. For a small number of parties, like the two-party and the three-party setting, constructing such protocols have been extremely challenging even in the cryptographic setting [29, 24, 13] . These constructions (roughly) match Cleve's O(1/n) lower-bound in the computational setting.
In the non-cryptographic setting, Cleve and Impagliazzo [15] exhibited that any two-party n-round bias-1/2 coin-tossing protocol are
√ n unfair. In particular, their adversary is a fail-stop adversary who follows the protocol honestly except aborting prematurely. In the information-theoretic commitment-hybrid, there are two-party n-round bias-1/2 coin-tossing protocols that have ≈ 1/ √ n unfairness [11, 6, 14] . This bound matches the lower-bound of Ω(1/ √ n) by Cleve and Impagliazzo [15] . It seems that it is necessary to rely on strong computational hardness assumptions or use these primitives in a non-black box manner to beat the 1/ √ n bound [16, 23, 17, 8] . We generalize the result of Cleve and Impagliazzo [15] to all 2-party n-round bias-X 0 cointossing protocols (and improve the constants by two orders of magnitude). For X 0 = 1/2, our fail-stop adversary changes the final outcome probability by
.
◮ Theorem 13 (Fail-stop Attacks on Coin-tossing Protocols). For any two-party n-round bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol, there exists a fail-stop adversary that changes the final outcome probability of the honest party by at least
Before proving the above theorem, we provide some insight into our approach. Let Π = A, B be an n-round bias-X 0 coin-tossing protocol between Alice and Bob. Without loss of generality, assume that Alice sends messages in rounds 1, 3, . . . , and Bob sends messages in rounds 2, 4, . . . . The random variable (E 1 , . . . , E i ) represents the partial transcript of the protocol at the end of round i. The random variable X i represents the expected probability of heads at the end of the protocol execution conditioned on the current partial transcript at the end of round i. Note that (X = (X i )
) is a Doob's martingale. We construct fail-stop adversaries only. Suppose Alice has to send the message in round (i + 1) (i.e., i is even), but she aborts. Then, the defense D i is the probability of Bob outputting heads. Similarly, suppose Bob is supposed to send the message in round (i + 1) (i.e., i is odd), but he aborts. Then, we define D i as the probability of Alice outputting heads. Note that D i is (E 1 , . . . , E i ) measurable. In other words, the defense of round i is a function only of the partial transcript at the end of that round.
The high-level idea of our construction of a good fail-stop attack is the following. We shall use a stopping time τ to identify appropriate partial transcripts of Π to abort. Suppose we have already generated a partial transcript (e 1 , . . . , e i ) (refer Figure 2) , and the next messages that are possible are e i+1 ∈ Ω i+1 . Suppose τ stops the martingale at e i+1 = e (j) . Note that X i+1 = x (j) is the probability of heads conditioned on the transcript Π being (e 1 , . . . , e i , e i+1 = e (j) ). Further, the defense of the other party is D i . If i is even, then Alice is supposed to send the (i + 1)-th message. So, the stopping time τ is indicating Alice to abort if the message in the next round she plans to send is e (j) . Suppose x (j) D i . Then, if Alice aborts when her next message is e (j) , then she is increasing the probability of heads by
So, the conclusion is the following. If i is even and x (j) D i then the advice of τ will be helpful to an adversarial Alice who is interested in increasing the probability of heads, say A + . If x (j) > D i , then the advice of τ will be helpful to an adversarial Alice who is interested in reducing the probability of heads, say A − . Similarly, when i is odd, the advice of τ is useful to either B + or B − . Specialized Stopping Time. For this discussion, let us consider Figure 7 . Note that if X 1 is very small (that is,
, then the adversary does not abort and recursively constructs the optimum stopping time. In particular (refer to Figure 5 and Figure 6 ) if there exists x (j) and
then the adversary aborts in both these two cases. This step is crucial to arguing that the point Q ′ is higher than the point Q in Figure 6 , which, in turn, is key to the transformation definition.
However, if a stopping time stops the martingale at high as well as low values of X i then it is not evident how to to translate the susceptibility corresponding to this stopping time into output-bias achieved by a fail-stop adversary. So, we restrict to specialized stopping times with the following property (we use Figure 7 for reference in the following definition).
Fix n and X 0 . Pick any i = n − d and fix
Either, the specialized stopping time stops for all X i+1 < x S (x) and recursively stops X i+1 x S (x) later, or The specialized stopping time stops all X i+1 > x L (x) and recursively stops X i+1 x L (x) later. Now, it is not evident whether specialized stopping times also have high susceptibility.
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and X n ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the following bound holds.
Let us start with the base case n = 1. Note that a specialized stopping time cannot stop the martingale at both low and high X 1 . So, we consider stopping times τ : Ω → {1, . . . , n, ∞}, where τ = ∞ for a full transcript indicates that the adversary did not abort. Note that a specialized stopping time can either stop the martingale when X 1 = 0 or X 1 = 1. In either of these two cases, the susceptibility is For n 2, we show that the recursive definition of the transform T continues to hold even for specialized stopping time (refer Figure 12 for intuition). Note that the adversary chooses the stopping time that achieves the highest susceptibility. So, the maximum height of Q ′ and Q ′′ in Figure 12 is greater than the height of Q. We emphasize that this proof crucially relies on the fact that C Finally, we translate the susceptibility of a specialized stopping time into output-bias that a fail-stop adversary can enforce. Subsection 5.1 provides the full proof of Theorem 13.
Detailed Discussion of Our Fail-stop Attack and Proofs
Given a stopping time τ we shall associate the following score with it
Intuitively, this score correctly accounts for the increase and decrease in the probability of heads in every round i. 4 We need the following claim
The score is slightly pessimistic, which, we argue, is also necessary. Note that our expression is of the form E (Xi − Di−1)½τ=i| . . . . One might naïvely consider using the expression E |Xi − Di−1| ½τ=i| . . . instead. However, there is an issue. Suppose the stopping time stops the martingale for all children of Xi. This strategy causes the outcome to deviate by |Xi − Di|, and our expression correctly accounts for it (because E [Xi+1] = Xi). However, the alternative expression accounts for it incorrectly. Basically, the alternative expression might not be translatable into a deviation of outcome by a fail-stop attacker.
If 0 x x 1 x (r) 1 (where x 1 is the solution of equation
Proof. We prove the first statement. Since for each n, C
, the second part is implied by the first part by replacing x, D,
. In order to show the first part, it is sufficient to show that
We also know that
x − x 0 and
Combining the above two relations we have
This completes the proof of our claim. ◭
We will use specialized stopping time defined in Section 5 to construct a stopping time for our fail-stop adversary. More formally, given a stopping time τ 1 from Theorem 14 such that sup τ1
Proof. The proof will proceed by induction on n. 1. Base Case: For n = 1, see Figure 13 . Recall that C ′ 1 (x) = x(1 − x). We have two cases If D x, we define τ 2 as the stopping time that stops only at 0. Then,
If D < x, we define τ 2 as the stopping time that stops only at 1. Figure 14 Inductive Hypothesis of Theorem 13
2. Assume the claim is true for n = d, see Figure 14 . For each edge x,
, then mark the edge. Let
. 
adversarial strategy is to recurse on the underlying subtrees. The overall deviation in this case is given by
Case 2. There exists a marked edge j such that D x. The adversarial strategy is to abort at the parent. 
To prove our claim, we define the curve G
for n 1 and we prove by induction that C ′ n G ′ n for all n as below: (analogous to the one shown for Lemma 2)
Base Case of n = 1. Since, C
. Now, by using Lemma 10, we conclude that Similar to the previous section, Theorem 13 extends to ω-faceted dice-rolling protocols by considering any subset S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1} of outcomes, and considering the final outcome being in S as the interesting event for the martingale.
Discussion of Specialized Stopping Time -Proof of Theorem 14
Before proving the theorem, we define the sequence of functions {g n } ∞ n=1 recursively. Let A n (X 0 ) be the set of all martingales X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) such that for each 0 i n − 1, X i ∈ [0, 1] and X n ∈ {0, 1}. We define
where F 1 (X 0 , X 1 ) := {τ 1 , τ 2 } and τ 1 is an stopping time defined on martingale (X 0 , X 1 ) such that τ 1 (X 0 , X 1 ) = 1 if X 1 = 0 and τ 1 (X 0 , X 1 ) = ∞ if X 1 = 1; and τ 2 (X 0 , X 1 ) = 1 if X 1 = 1 and τ 2 (X 0 , X 1 ) = ∞ if X 1 = 0. Note that F 1 (X 0 , X 1 ) represents the set of all specialized stopping times in martingale (X 0 , X 1 ). A 1 (X 0 ) consists of only one martingale
where F n (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) denotes the set of all specialized stopping times like τ defined on martingale X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) which could be one of the following two cases: Suppose X 0 = x and X 1 = x * . Then, let x 0 ∈ [0, 1] be the solution of equation x − x 0 = g n−1 (x 0 ) and x 1 ∈ [0, 1] be the solution of equation
. . , X n ). This corresponds to the case that the specialized stopping time stops for all x * x 0 and recursively stops for all
. . , X n ). This corresponds to the case that the specialized stopping time stops for all x * x 1 and recursively stops for all x * x 1 later.
To prove Theorem 14, it suffices to prove the following claim.
We first describe the intuitive idea behind the proof and then give a technical proof afterwards. Proof Sketch. We use induction on n to prove the claim. For n = 1 and for each x ∈ [0, 1], we have g 1 
Let us consider martingale (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n , X n+1 ) where X 0 = x and X 1 ∈ {x (1) , . . . , x (t) }. According to the induction hypothesis, the adversary is guaranteed to get g n (x (j) ) = C ′ n (x (j) ) as the score in any martingale of depth n if she chooses an appropriate stopping time in F n (x (j) , X 2 , . . . , X n+1 ). We define left marked edges as the set {j : x (j) x and |x − x (j) | C ′ n (x (j) )} and right marked edges as the set {j : x (j) x and |x − x (j) | C ′ n (x (j) )}. Now, to prove that g n+1 (X) = T g n (X) it suffices to show that in any arbitrary martingale in A n+1 (x), the maximum score that could be achieved by either stopping the martingale at only left marked edges at time 1 or stopping the martingale at only right marked edges at time 1, is always guaranteed to be greater than or equal to Figure 12 , we are considering a martingale (x, X 1 , . . . , X n , X n+1 ) such that X 1 can take only two values either x l or x r with probabilities p l and p r respectively. Note that x l x S (x) and x L (x) x r . Any specialized stopping time τ either stops at x l and continues at x r or stops at x r and continues at x l . Here, the curve C ′ n represents the points (x, g n (x)) for 0 x 1. According to the induction hypothesis, in martingale (x l , X 2 , . . . , X n ), the score g n (x l ) is guaranteed to be achieved (so the contribution of score when martingale doesn't stop at this edge is p l g n (x l )) but if martingale stops at time 1 at edge (x, x l ), then the contribution of score for this edge is p l |x − x l |. A similar thing can be said about x r . We can observe that while the point Q ′′ (which is the intersection of line D l U r with line X = x and its height corresponds to the score achieved when martingale stops at x r and continues at x l ) lies below the point Q = (x, g n+1 (x)) (which is the intersection of line P 1 P 2 with line X = x and its height corresponds to T (g n (x))), the point Q ′ (which is the intersection of line U l D r with line X = x E i . This intervention is identical to restarting the i-th processor if the adversary does not like her message. Note that this intervention changes the final outcome by
We shall use a stopping time τ to represent the time-step where an adversary decides to intervene. However, for some (E 1 = e 1 , . . . , E n = e n ) the adversary may not choose to intervene. Consequently, we consider stopping times τ : Ω → {1, . . . , n, ∞}, where the stopping time being ∞ corresponds to the event that the adversary did not choose to intervene. In the Doob martingale discussed above, as a direct consequence of Theorem 1, there exists a stopping time τ * with susceptibility C n (X 0 ). Note that susceptibility measures the expected (unsigned) magnitude of the deviation, if an adversary intervenes at τ * . Some of these contributions to susceptibility shall increase the probability of the final outcome being 1, and the remaining shall decrease the probability of the final outcome being 1. By an averaging argument, there exists a stopping time τ : Ω → {1, . . . , n, ∞} that biases the outcome of f by at least 1 2 C n (X 0 ), whence the following corollary.
◮ Corollary 18 (Influencing Discrete Control Processes).
Let Ω 1 , . . . , Ω n be arbitrary sets, and (E 1 , . . . , E n ) be a joint distribution over the set Ω := Ω 1 ×· · · × Ω n . Let f : Ω → {0, 1} be a function such that P f (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = 1 = X 0 . Then, there exists an adversarial strategy of intervening once to bias the probability of the outcome away from X 0 by
The previous result of [15] applies only to X 0 = 1/2 and they ensure a deviation of 1/320 √ n. For X 0 = 1/2, our result ensures a deviation of (roughly) 1/4 √ 2n ≈ 1/5.66 √ n.
Influencing Multi-faceted Dice-rolls
Corollary 18 generalizes to the setting where f : Ω → {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1}, i.e., the function f outputs an arbitrary ω-faceted dice roll. In fact, we quantify the deviation in the probability of any subset S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1} of outcomes caused by an adversary intervening once.
◮ Corollary 19 (Influencing Multi-faceted Dice-Rolls). Let Ω 1 , . . . , Ω n be arbitrary sets, and (E 1 , . . . , E n ) be a joint distribution over the set Ω := Ω 1 ×· · ·×Ω n . Let f : Ω → {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1} be a function with ω 2 outcomes, S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ω − 1} be any subset of outcomes, and P f (E 1 , . . . , E n ) ∈ S = X 0 . Then, there exists an adversarial strategy of intervening once to bias the probability of the outcome being in S away from X 0 by 
Application 4 : L 2 Gaps and their Tightness
In Section 3 we measured the gaps in martingales using the L 1 -norm, here, we extend this analysis to gaps in martingales using the L 2 -norm. To begin, let us fix X 0 and n. We change the definition of susceptibility to sup stopping time τ
Our objective is to characterize the martingale that is least susceptible 
Then g(x)
:= G.M.(y (1) , y (2) ), where x) ), and G.M.(y (1) , y (2) ) represents the geometric mean of y (1) and y ◮ Theorem 20. Let (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a discrete-time martingale such that X n ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the following bound holds. 
Proof.
We shall proceed by induction on n. Base Case n = 1. Note that in this case (see Figure 4 ) the optimal stopping time is τ = 1.
General Inductive
Step. Let us fix X 0 = x and n = d 2. We proceed analogous to the argument in Section 3. The adversary can either decide to stop at the child j (see Figure 5 for reference) or continue to the subtree rooted at it to find a better stopping time.
X-axis
• Z (2) • Z (3) • Z (4) • Z (5) • Z (6) • Z (7) • Q ′ • Q Figure 16 Intuitive Summary of the inductive argument. Our objective is to pick the set of points {Z (1) , Z (2) . . . } in the gray region to minimize the length of the intercept XQ ′ of their (lower) convex hull on the line X = x. Clearly, the unique optimal solution corresponds to including both P1 and P2 in this set.
Overall, the adversary gets the following contribution from the j-th child
The adversary obtains a score that is at least the height of Q in Figure 16 . Further, a martingale designer can choose t = 2, and Z (1) = P 1 and Z (2) = P 2 to define the optimal martingale. Similar to Theorem 1, the scores corresponding to all possible stopping times in the optimal martingale are identical.
We can argue that the height of Q is the geometric-mean of the heights of P 1 and P 2 . This observation defines the geometric transformation T ′ in Figure 15 . For this transformation, we demonstrate that D n (X 0 ) = 2 . Then we have:
Let y 0 = d n x 0 (1 − x 0 ) and y 1 = d n x 1 (1 − x 1 ), then we have the following relations:
Now, according to the definition of transformation T ′ in Figure 15 , we have D n+1 (x) = √ y 0 y 1 and:
Note that, for any martingale (X 0 , . . . , X n ) with X n ∈ {0, 1}, we have E n X 0 (1−X 0 ). Theorem 20 proves the existence of a martingale that achieves the lower-bound even for non-constant stopping times. This result provides a technique to obtain the upper-bound to C n (X) in Lemma 2.
Alternate Proof for U n+1 T (U n )
Proof. Recall that we defined D n as the zeros of the curve Y = 1 n X(1 − X). Since U n is defined by the zeros of the curve Y = 1 n X(1 − X), by squaring the Y -values for U n , we can obtain the curve D n . This is illustrated in Figure 17 . Denote points on curve U n as P 1 := (x 0 , y 0 ), P 2 := (x 1 , y 1 ) and points on curve D n as P .(α, β) . After squaring, in the right-hand figure Q = (H.M.(α, β) . Also, after squaring the Y -axis, the locus of the point Q defines the curve T 2 (U n ), therefore we have just shown that U , and the locus of the point Q ′ defines this curve, we only need to show that Q ′ is always above Q in the right-hand figure in order to prove our original claim.
